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4.1. Introduction 
 
It is commonly recognized that the theoretical debate on corporate governance and 
ownership structure has been typically focused on major firms, typically belonging to 
the Anglo-Saxon contexts, characterized by the separation between ownership and 
control, from which conflicts of interests may arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
Conversely, corporate governance in smaller companies seems to have received 
minor attention, despite the importance acknowledged by governments to such 
companies in the development of local economies, especially in those countries (i.e. Italy 
and Spain) characterized by widespread entrepreneurship, such as the industrial 
districts. Extant literature on corporate governance of smaller firms tends to scrutinize 
the implications of the coincidence between ownership (often belonging to a family) and 
control, which gives rise to an entrepreneurial model of governance (Bennedsen & 
Wolfenzon, 2000; Abor & Adjasi, 2007; Uhlaner, Wright, & Huse, 2007). 
Among small firms, medium-sized enterprises (MSEs) (the size class 
characterized by employees between 50 and 499 and annual sales between 13 and 290 
million Euros) are a neglected area of research, as the literature focused on such type of 
enterprises has been very limited. Following Mediobanca (2017), this may be related to 
two main causes. Firstly, such companies have been seen mostly as belonging to a 
temporary stage along the path from small to large size, so the attention of scholars has 
been dedicated to the two extremes of the continuum (Storey, 2002); secondly, there is a 
lack of focused statistics on medium-size enterprises, as those compiled for legal or 
regulatory purposes consider a unique entity: small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
(Alzona & Iacobucci, 2005). 
This typology of firms represents indeed an interesting research area from a 
corporate governance point of view, as they present a wide spectrum of ownership and 
corporate governance structures in which the full coincidence between 
entrepreneur/owner and manager may not exist, especially if the companies are listed 
(Preuss & Perschke, 2010).  
Such companies are characterized by high ownership concentration, with very 
strong entrepreneurs, but, at the same time, like larger firms, they show increasing 
levels of separation between ownership and control, in terms of cash flow rights and 
control (Alzona & Iacobucci, 2005). Such separation is not achieved by the adoption of 
widely dispersed ownership, but mainly by means of a set of mechanisms created in 
order to enhance control, such as pyramidal groups, dual-class shares and shareholder 
agreements, reinforced by cross-ownership and interlocking directorates (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000; Bianchi, Bianco, & Enriques, 2001; Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
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All these instruments allow firms to growth “without capital”, maintaining a stable 
control, with very few cases of hostile takeovers. On the other side, the use of these 
mechanisms increases the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders and 
consequently controlling shareholders may extract a considerable amount of private 
benefits of control (Bigelli & Mengoli, 2004). Examples of expropriation include asset 
sales, transfer pricing favourable to the main shareholder, excessive executive 
compensation, dilutive share issues, insider trading, and so on, that literature knows as 
practices of “tunnelling” (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000; 
Sancetta, Cucari, & Esposito De Falco, 2018). 
As such firms present a quite high relative weight in the Italian and in other 
European contexts, belonging to the non-Anglo Saxon system, such as Spain, France, 
Portugal, Germany, Austria and Belgium, in terms of employment and value added, it is 
worthy to focus on them, given that only a few studies exist (Morelli & Monarca, 2005; 
Genco & Penco, 2012; Profumo, 2013). In Italy, for example, the percentage of 
manufacturing employment in medium-sized firms is 27.3%%, while the share of MSEs’ 
value added in manufacturing is 33.9% (Confindustria, R&S, & Unioncamere, 2013). 
Higher percentages are shown by Spain for value added (36.6%) and by Germany for 
employment (34.5%). 
In light of these considerations, the present chapter intends to add to extant 
corporate governance literature, answering the following research questions (RQ):  
RQ1: What are the specific corporate governance characteristics of medium-sized 
listed firms, especially in terms of ownership structure and composition? 
RQ2: Which are the most important governance mechanisms used by medium-sized 
listed firms aimed at separating ownership from control? 
Focusing on the corporate governance features of a sample of Italian medium-
sized listed firms, the chapter may constitute a useful contribution for developing 
research knowledge on the phenomenon. In particular, it develops corporate governance 
literature on smaller firms and on their control mechanisms which is not so widespread 
among scholars, especially in case of not fully coincidence of ownership and control. 
Moreover, the study advances small and medium enterprises (SMEs)’ literature, 
focusing on a neglected area of research: medium-sized firms. 
The study presents also some implications for governments and local authorities 
or financial market regulators, as the listing process of smaller companies does not seem 
to create more open ownership structures, which are appealing for institutional 
investors and conflicts of interests between controlling owners and minority 
shareholders are still present. 
In order to meet the above goals, the remainder of this chapter is organized as 
follows. The second section, by addressing the extant literature on the definition of 
corporate governance in small and medium firms, provides the theoretical background 
useful for the analysis of medium-sized firms. The third section presents the main 
features of the Italian context, in terms of ownership and control. The fourth section 
describes the main characteristics of Italian medium-sized firms, while section five 
defines the sample of listed MSEs. Section six presents the results of the empirical 
analysis. The last section discusses the results as well as the suggested implications for 
academics and managers, together with the main limitations of the study and 
indications for further research. 
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4.2. Corporate governance in small businesses: a literature review 
 
Despite small and medium enterprises constitute the backbone of the economy of many 
European countries, the corporate governance literature on this typology of enterprises 
is still a neglected area of research (Abor & Adjasi, 2007; Uhlaner et al., 2007). The 
extent corporate governance theories, such as the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) and the resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) have, in 
fact, been developed thinking about big corporations. 
In this vein, corporate governance issues related to small businesses may be 
primarily found in other theoretical frameworks, such as family business and 
entrepreneurship domains. 
In the family business domain (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), it is possible to find few 
contributions substantially focused on the relationship between “ownership and control” 
(Corbetta & Montemerlo, 1999), on the role, composition and functioning of the Board of 
Directors (Ward & Handy, 1988; Corbetta & Tomaselli, 1996), on the delicate phase of 
the intergenerational transition (Handler, 1994) and on the relationship between the 
presence of a family in the control of a company and firm’s performance (Anderson, 
Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). However, it 
is important to recognize that the coincidence between family businesses and small 
businesses is not always expected since, especially in Latin Countries, families manage 
and control also big and global listed corporations (see Fiat, Benetton, Luxottica in 
Italy), with large management teams and pressures towards strict governance rules; 
consequentially, family business literature can only partially help to understand the 
governance features of small and medium-sized firms. 
Corporate governance in small businesses could also be studied within the 
entrepreneurship domain. It is well known that SMEs are fundamentally linked to the 
figure of the entrepreneur. Nevertheless, SMEs may be characterized by different 
ownership structures:  
 the “founder-owner” model, where the entrepreneur is at the same time the 
majority shareholder and the CEO, without any conflict between ownership and control; 
 the “multiple ownership structure” model, in which majority and minority 
shareholders coexist, with consequent governance problems due to differences in the 
respective objectives (Uhlaner et al., 2007).  
In the multiple ownership structure, typical of the growing phases of small 
businesses, the main shareholder of the company usually coincides with the 
entrepreneur; but as the external pressures in terms of transparency and accountability 
increase, especially in case of listed firms (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007), 
conflicts with minority shareholders (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), due to the extraction of 
“private benefits of control”, may emerge. Examples of expropriation include asset sales, 
transfer pricing favourable to the main shareholder, excessive executive compensation, 
dilutive share issues, insider trading, and so on, known as practices of “tunnelling” 
(Johnson et al., 2000). 
In order to explain the potential conflicts between the majority 
shareholder/entrepreneur and the minority shareholders, is the agency theory 
applicable (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)? And what about the resource-based view of the 
firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991)? 
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The ownership settings of small businesses reduce some of the traditional agency 
problems but generate other governance concerns, related to diverging interests and 
conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). Also for mitigating such agency problem and ensuring that managers act 
in the interest of shareholders, internal and external governance mechanisms have been 
introduced. 
As small businesses usually present a strong entrepreneurial imprint combined 
sometimes with external management that leads to a concentration of the executive 
power in the board, internal control mechanisms become crucial (Brunninge et al., 
2007). The external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate 
control, typical of a market-oriented system, are in fact rarely used in companies with a 
high level of ownership concentration. 
Among the internal control mechanisms, following the agency theory framework, 
debt capital and board of directors are applicable instruments for SMEs, aimed at 
controlling and reducing discretionality of entrepreneurs and managers (Profumo, 
2013). 
Firstly, the relevance of debt capital is usually very high in SMEs, particularly in 
bank-based countries like Italy; this implies the implementation of indirect control by 
the financial institutions that normally tend to appear as a "silent" stakeholder, at least 
until the profitability of the company is preserved. 
Secondly, the board of directors is viewed as a primary instrument for monitoring 
the management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). The board may, in fact, mitigate agency 
problems thanks to the appointment of independent managers, i.e. professional 
managers with expertise in monitoring activities and who have interest in exercising 
control in order to maintain their reputational capital (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). The 
proportion of independent outside directors to the total number of directors is therefore 
usually applied as a proxy variable for board monitoring efficacy (Satta, Parola, 
Profumo, & Penco, 2015). 
An active board may have a significant influence on the value-creating potential 
of small and medium companies (Gabrielsson, 2007). While smaller companies tend to 
have a board of directors without any substantial power, as their size increases, non-
executive and independent directors tend to be included within the board, improving the 
control activities, especially in case of listed firms. Gabrielsson and Huse (2005) 
recognize, however, that the strong relationship with the owner/entrepreneur, who has 
a pivotal role in their selection, remuneration and in providing them with the necessary 
information, is able to reduce the effectiveness of the control process. 
Focusing on the theoretical framework of the resource-based view of the firm, 
instead, boards are positively seen, as they may provide valuable expertise and 
capabilities, influence and aid in strategy formulation, in particular for smaller firms. 
The presence of private equity or venture capital firms in the board could, in fact, 
enhance the effectiveness of its monitoring role (Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor, 
1993; Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998), providing professional competencies and skills 
that help to reduce conflicts (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005). Within the same theoretical 
vein, it has been noted that managers of smaller companies tend to have more general 
knowledge and experience than large companies, where there is greater specialization in 
functions or processes (Preuss & Perschke, 2010), and they hold a rather informal and 
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relationship-based management style. 
In this sense, some scholars have pointed out that instead of a contractual type of 
governance (on which the agency theory is based), in SMEs, in particular, family based, 
informal relational governance prevails, focused on long term relationship and 
reciprocal trust with management (Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002). In fact, control, 
rather than being based on contracts, incentives and formal monitoring systems, 
appears to be more based on "social" variables, such as relationships of trust, a vision of 
the company shared by all the shareholders and the entrepreneur's commitment 
towards the company itself (Uhlaner et al., 2007). In these cases, therefore, the agency 
theory does not help to explain the reasons why an entrepreneurial manager could 
pursue the interests of the company, even when their pursuing goes against personal 
interest. In this regard, other theoretical approaches are more useful, to which little 
space has been given in the corporate governance literature: in particular, stewardship 
theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) and paternalism (Huse, 2007), that consider 
managers as positive and trustworthy agents, motivated by altruistic feelings and sense 
of responsibility. 
 
4.3. Ownership and control in Italy 
 
Like many other countries of continental Europe, Italian corporate governance is 
primarily based on high ownership concentration, for both listed and unlisted 
companies, and dominance of the main shareholder, or a small group of shareholders 
with family ties (Consob, 2017; Melis, 2000). Separation between ownership, in terms of 
cash flow rights, and control is not achieved by a widely dispersed ownership, but 
mainly by means of a set of mechanisms created in order to enhance control, such as 
pyramidal groups, dual-class shares and shareholder agreements, reinforced by cross-
ownership and interlocking directorates (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; 
Bianchi et al., 2001; Esposito De Falco, Cucari, & Di Franco, 2018), even if their use is 
declining over time. 
All these instruments have allowed the growth of “capitalism without capital” 
and have permitted a stable control environment, with very few cases of hostile 
takeovers (Bianchi et al., 2001). 
The use of these mechanisms is well known in other countries belonging to the 
“insider” corporate governance model (Franks & Mayer, 1997), but in Italy it is higher 
the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders and, consequently, controlling 
shareholders may extract a considerable amount of private benefits of control (Bigelli & 
Mengoli, 2004; Esposito De Falco, 2014, 2017). 
Ownership of Italian listed firms is still highly concentrated, with almost 9 out of 
10 firms controlled either by a single shareholder or by a shareholders’ agreement 
(Consob, 2017). 
As shown in Table 4.1, consistently with the limited contestability of control in the 
Italian market, the average stake held by the largest shareholder is 47,2% in 2017, 
substantially stable with respect to its 2010 value (46.2%) and also to the 1990 value 
(47.9%). Concentration began to drop in 1997, after the huge process of privatisation 
and the introduction of the Finance Consolidation Act, but the decreasing trend stopped 
after ten years and from 2010 onwards the stake of the largest shareholder has 
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remained stable over 46%. In the last five years, instead, the average stake held by 
other shareholders (i.e. minority shareholders holding at least 2% of the capital with 
voting rights) has experienced a five percentage point decline, highlighting the 
diminishing role of the coalitions among shareholders. 
 
Table 4.1. Average ownership concentration in Italian listed firms (% of total shares) 
 
Shareholder type 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Largest shareholder 47.9 44.0 46.2 46.1 46.8 46.8 46.0 46.7 46,9 47,2 
Other relevant shareholders 11.4 9.4 17.7 17.6 16.8 16.5 16.5 15.0 12,8 12,1 
Market (1) 40.7 46.6 36.1 36.3 36.4 36.7 37.5 38.3 40,3 40,6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Consob (2018) 
(1) Market is defined as the sum of all holdings smaller than 2% of the capital 
 
The most widely-used mechanism to obtain control over a company with a limited 
capital investment is pyramidal groups. In Italy, these structures are very common, in 
particular among listed companies, even if their importance has decreased over time. 
Italian hierarchical groups are usually characterised by long control chains, although, in 
the last few years, financial globalisation, pressures from foreign institutional investors 
and financial difficulties of some groups, have forced controlling shareholders to simplify 
their group structures, reducing voting leverage and integrated ownership. The average 
leverage (calculated as the ratio between the units of capital controlled and the units of 
capital owned) has in fact passed from 3.5 in 1998 to 2.2 in 2011 and has further 
shortened to 1.7 in 2016 (Consob, 2017). Also, companies belonging to pyramids have 
dropped to 16.5% of the MTA Stock Exchange (slightly more than 44% of market 
capitalization) from nearly 39% scored in 1998 (78% in terms of capitalization) (Consob, 
2017). 
Shareholders’ coalitions are also widely spread among Italian listed companies, 
even though, in the last few years, there has been evidence of a decrease in the use of 
such instruments (Consob, 2017): in 2010 shareholders’ agreements were 51 and 
accounted for 12.4% of market capitalization, while in 2016 the number of companies 
declaring a voting block was only 29 (Table 4.2). 
Coalitions may play a role similar to holding companies: an individual can gain 
control of a company having the majority of voting rights of the coalition. Indeed, 
coalition governance is probably more complex, considering the bonds of trust that exist 
among shareholders. 
The importance of the shareholders’ coalitions among listed companies has grown 
over time, but they have switched from formal shareholders’ agreements to weak 
informal coalitions, where there is a main shareholder who owns stakes between 20% 
and 30%, and other minor shareholders, without a formal contract among the parties, as 
shown in Table 4.2. The weight of the firms with a weak form of control has reached 
43.6% of total capitalization in 2016 (it was 21.8% in 1998), but this does not mean that 
these types of firms are characterized by diffuse ownership. Only 32 firms out of 230 in 
2016 do not present evidence of control, and they account for 22.6% of the market. 
In most of the listed firms (116 out of 230 in 2016), it is still present a shareholder 
with a majority stake, especially in smaller companies, as they account only for 27.2% of 
the total market capitalization. 
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Table 4.2. Control models of Italian listed firms 
 
Year 
Majority control 
“De facto” control 
(weak control) b 
Formal coalition 
control 
Not evidence of 
control 
Total 
Number Weighta Number Weight Number Weight Number Weight Number Weight 
1998 122 31.2 33 21.8 28 8.3 33 38.7 216 100 
2010 128 20.6 53 43.0 51 12.4 38 24.0 270 100 
2011 123 22.3 55 45.8 48 12.0 34 19.9 260 100 
2012 125 22.8 49 44.0 42 10.1 35 23.1 251 100 
2013 122 24.1 48 40.1 38 10.4 36 25.4 244 100 
2014 116 25.0 51 36.8 32 9.6 39 28.5 238 100 
2015 115 28.1 52 34.8 30 6.0 37 31.1 234 100 
2016 116 27.2 53 43.6 29 6.5 32 22.6 230 100 
Source: Consob (2017) 
(a) % of total market capitalisation 
(b) Companies neither controlled by a shareholders’ agreement nor majority controlled, included in one of the following 
categories: i) a single shareholder holds at least 30% of the ordinary shares; ii) a single shareholder holds a stake a) higher 
than 20% of the ordinary shares and b) higher than half of the sum of the ordinary shares held by all the major shareholders 
 
Another instrument used to separate ownership and control is dual-class shares 
that means shares with fewer voting (or non-voting) rights than the others (savings or 
preference shares).  
In Italy, their issue has been very common since their introduction in 1974: 
according to Faccio and Lang (2002), in fact, during the nineties, about 40% of Italian 
companies issued savings shares. However, their role as a means of separation between 
ownership and control began to drop afterwards (Bianchi, Bianco, Giacomelli, Pacces, & 
Trento, 2005): considering only listed companies, in fact, the number of firms issuing 
non-voting shares in the Stock Exchange has decreased from 104 in 1992, to 18 in 2016, 
while the weight of this type of shares on total shares, in 2016, was only 7.8% (42.6% in 
1992) (Consob, 2017). 
Also, loyalty and multiple voting shares are not so widespread among Italian 
listed firms, being issued only by few family-controlled companies. In this case, there is 
a publicly traded "inferior" class of stock with one vote per share and a non-publicly 
traded "superior" class of stock with more votes per share that is usually owned by 
family members. 
 
4.4. Italian medium-sized firms: principal features 
 
4.4.1. The main characteristics of Italian medium-sized firms  
 
In order to define the typology “medium-sized firm”, the European Union fixes some 
quantitative standards which must be reached: 50-249 employees, together with a 
turnover under 50 million euro and total assets under 43 million euro.  
Mediobanca (an Italian research institute) defines, instead, medium-sized firms, 
as all the companies with employees between 50-499 and total turnover between 16 and 
355 million euro (Mediobanca, 2017). Moreover, a medium-sized firm has to be 
independent, so it must not be controlled by large companies or international groups 
(Mediobanca, 2017). It is important to underline that Mediobanca analyses only 
medium-sized manufacturing firms, excluding service firms. 
The prevailing most recent studies on Italian medium-sized firms have followed 
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the criteria provided by Mediobanca and have shown how, in 2015, the number of 
medium-sized enterprises operating in manufacturing industries in Italy was 3,316 
(Mediobanca, 2017). 
As regards their localization, medium-sized firms operate mainly in the North 
West area (in particular Lombardia), North East and in some Regions of the Center of 
Italy. Medium-sized firms are also focused on particular industries, such as Made in 
Italy (Fortis, 2005; Esposito De Falco, 2008). 
Due to the growing relevance of medium-sized firms in the Italian economic 
system, recent literature has focused the attention on their qualitative characteristics 
(Corbetta, 2000; Butera, 1998; Simon, 2001; Tunisini & Dalli, 2007; Varaldo, Dalli, 
Resciniti, & Tunisini, 2009; Butera & De Michelis, 2011). 
These contributions have shown that most of them are dynamic and flexible firms, 
which operate in international markets and compete on high-quality market segments 
(Coltorti, 2008; Varaldo et al., 2009). Several authors recognize in the cluster of 
medium-sized firms the paradigm of the Fourth Capitalism that is the new competitive 
source of success for the Italian system (Coltorti, 2008). 
With regard to strategic orientation, medium-sized firms prefer to remain ‘blind’ 
leaders (Simon, 2001; Genco & Penco, 2012): international firms that assume a 
dominant market share tend, in fact, to limit the media exposure about their results in 
order to avoid the rivalry. Moreover, they are used to focus on narrow market niches 
and to operate in protected niches (Butera, 1998), where the source of their competitive 
advantage is rarely externally revealed.  
As concerns corporate governance, medium-sized firms show peculiarities in 
terms of ownership structure and board composition and functioning (Zahra, Neubaum, 
& Huse, 2000; Brunninge et al., 2007; Profumo, 2013).  
These firms are characterised by a strong (and often family-based) 
entrepreneurial imprint coupled sometimes with external management (Corbetta, 2000; 
Grundei & Talaulicar, 2002; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005; Gabrielsson, 2007): this leads to 
a concentration of the executive power which may drive towards a strong commitment 
in reaching family’s or owner’s primary goals (i.e. maintaining the control of the firm, 
offering employment opportunities to family members, dynastic management) 
(Corbetta, 2000; Tunisini & Dalli, 2007). Nonetheless, the pivotal role of 
entrepreneur/family in managing the company is accomplished by the growing relevance 
of professional managers in firms’ strategic governance. 
Focusing on the financial profile, academic literature clearly states the peculiar 
behaviour of medium-sized firms, which is characterised by a shortage of financial 
resources and by a prudential and traditional approach to funding sources (Corbetta, 
2000). 
As regards, instead, the organizational structure, medium-sized firms’ approach 
to human resource management has had a considerable influence on the build-up of the 
success. The organizational flexibility and the relevance of human resources may, in 
fact, be considered as a source of competitive advantage (Butera & DeMichelis, 2011). 
Medium-sized firms frequently adopt a network organization, especially in the local 
system, but often enlarged at an international dimension. 
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4.4.2. The implications of the listing process 
 
The literature on Italian medium-sized listed firms is still limited, nevertheless, the 
listing process tends to create new challenges for this typology of firms and relevant 
impacts on several profiles. 
In terms of strategic choices, medium-sized listed firms show, as all listed firms, a 
strong orientation towards growth and corporate performance, both in the pre-IPO 
phase, in order to improve their track record, and in the post-IPO stage, in order to 
satisfy shareholders' expectations (Franzosi & Pellizzoni, 2005). Consequently, medium-
sized listed firms tend to expand their market, implementing a "dynamic innovation” 
and entering global networks. 
In order to accomplish their growth, the process of managerialization of the 
internal competencies is required in all functional areas (Rey & Varaldo, 2011). From 
the financial structure perspective, the listing process reduces the cost of debt, thanks to 
the greater reputation, the widening of external relations and the greater bargaining 
power that a listed firm gains.  
Since the ownership structure is expanded to new investors, entrepreneurs and/or 
managers are subject to the judgment and sanction expressed by the financial 
performance on the stock market (Satta et al., 2015), together with the disclosure of 
information about strategic choices and governance. A listed firm usually: (i) provides a 
larger amount of mandatory information to investors; (ii) widens the type of 
communication instruments and (iii) increases the strategic orientation of its market 
disclosure. From an organisational viewpoint, listed enterprises have to establish 
dedicated investor relations departments (IR) assigned with specific economic/financial 
and relational competencies. 
In terms of governance, listed firms must respond to an external request for 
control, transparency and ex-ante information in order to protect minority shareholders. 
In this vein, listed firms usually improve their governance practices, introducing 
independent outside directors, independent auditing structure and disclosure and 
remuneration committees. 
As regards, instead, firm ownership structure, after the listing process, a decrease 
in ownership concentration is expected, although it is well known that in the Italian 
listed firms the decrease of ownership concentration tends to be counterbalanced by a 
set of mechanisms created in order to enhance control, such as pyramidal groups, dual-
class shares and shareholder agreements (Bianchi et al., 2001; Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
In view of these considerations, the analysis of the corporate governance features 
of medium-sized listed firms will be the focus of the empirical part of the chapter. In 
particular, aiming at responding to the two research questions, the analysis is 
addressed to better understand the ownership structure and composition of such type of 
firms and, more importantly, the different governance mechanisms used for separating 
ownership from control, considering that, to the best of our knowledge, no studies 
focused the attention on the implications of the listing process in the governance of a 
medium-sized firm. 
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4.5. Italian medium-sized listed firms: the sample 
 
The dataset used in the present study has been gathered following a three-phase 
collection process, ensuring accuracy and consistency of the empirical findings. 
Corporate governance and financial data were obtained from the Capital-IQ 
database. Capital-IQ database is a market intelligence platform designed by Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P), widely used in many areas of corporate finance, including investment 
banking, equity research, asset management and corporate governance. In particular, 
we selected all the firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (Phase I).  
We then applied the criteria proposed by Mediobanca (2017) for awarding the 
status of a medium-sized enterprise. Consistent with previous Italian authors (Tunisini 
& Bocconcelli, 2009; Morresi & Pezzi, 2012; Genco & Penco, 2012; Profumo, 2013) and 
international scholars (Pavitt, Robson, & Townsend, 1987; Perks, 2006), the above-
criteria were preferred with respect to the parameters defined by the EU Commission. 
This choice is fully in line with the purpose of this article, whose theoretical angle is 
based on corporate governance issues; therefore, legislative and scale profiles related to 
firm size are deliberately left aside.  
In particular, the sample was composed by the Italian listed firms which 
respected for at least 2 years the above parameters in the timeframe 2015-2017; after 
the financial and economic crisis, it is still present big volatility in many financial 
parameters of listed firms, so we preferred to be as inclusive as possible. Financial and 
banking firms and firms that went bankrupt in the selected timeframe have been 
excluded from the analysis to ensure data homogeneity and availability. We then 
arrived with a final sample of 69 firms that correspond to the universe of the Italian 
medium-sized listed firms (Phase II). 
In order to complete missing values, data retrieved by Capital-IQ were cross-
checked with information disclosed by firms in corporate annual reports and financial 
statements and by Consob and Borsa Italiana websites (Phase III), in which information 
on corporate governance is present.  
Table 4.3 visualizes the most important features of the sample. The average 
annual revenues in the timeframe are nearly 80 million euro, total assets more than 155 
million euro, while the average number of employees is 144. 
 
Table 4.3. The sample 
 
Year Total Revenues (average – million €) Total Assets (average – million €) 
2015 78.0 155.1 
2016 74.7 155.6 
2017 80.2 165.4 
∆ 2015-2017 3% 7% 
Industry N. of medium-sized firms % 
Health 4 5.8% 
High tech 10 14.5% 
Manufacturing 26 37.7% 
Manufacturing (Agrifood) 2 2.9% 
Real Estate 4 5.8% 
Services 17 24.6% 
Utilities/Energy 6 8.7% 
Total 69 100.0% 
Source: authors’ elaboration on Capital-IQ – Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
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Regarding the industry, they belong to various sectors, including Health, High 
tech, Manufacturing and Agrifood, Real Estate, Services and Utilities/Energy. Most of 
them are focused on Manufacturing (37.7%), and in particular on specific activities 
linked to Made in Italy (e.g. Bialetti; Beghelli; Zucchi; Gruppo Ceramiche Ricchetti) and 
on Services. 
 
4.6. Corporate governance features of Italian medium-sized listed firms 
 
4.6.1. Ownership structure and composition 
 
Following the limited contestability of control in the Italian market, the average stake 
held by the largest shareholder of medium-sized listed firms is rather high, even if 
slightly lower than the average of all Italian listed firms (Table 4.4). In particular, at 
the end of 2017, it was 44.93%, with an overall average of the market of 47.2%. The 
importance of the ultimate controlling agent is also stressed by the median value which 
is 50.06% and by the maximum stake that is nearly 90%.  
A preliminary independent t-test analysis has been performed in order to identify 
the evidence of a statistically significant difference between the ownership structure of 
the mean of the population of medium-sized firms and the mean of the universe of 
Italian listed firms. The analysis has returned a p-value that is <0.05, demonstrating 
that such differences are significant. 
 
Table 4.4. Ownership concentration of Italian medium-sized listed firms – 2017* 
 
 Average Median Max Min Average of all Italian listed firms 
Largest shareholding 44.93 50.06 89.67 0.104 47.2 
Three largest shareholdings 58.01 65.67 92.23 0.113 n.a. 
Source: S&P Capital IQ and Consob (2018) 
(*) % on the total market capitalization 
 
When we consider the sum of the three major shareholders, the average 
percentage is 58.01%, with a median of 65.67%: this means that in medium-sized listed 
firms other relevant shareholders are present, that help the ultimate owner to manage 
the company, or, at least, they possess a stake with whom they may control their 
interests. Ownership concentration is therefore very high, with only a few cases in 
which the largest shareholder owns a stake below 20% (13 companies out of 69). 
In order to better understand ownership concentration and how control is 
exercised, it is useful to analyse the identity of the ultimate firm’s owners. In medium-
sized listed companies, a great role is played by private companies and individuals, 
while it is marginal the direct ownership of institutional investors, the State and listed 
companies. 
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Table 4.5. Ownership distribution of Italian medium-sized listed firms – 2017* 
 
 
Medium-sized listed firms 
(average %) 
Total Italian listed firms 
(average %) 
Institutional investors, in particular: 6.42 12.37 
Venture Capital and Private Equity firms 2.24 1.57 
Banks and investment banks 0.12 0.45 
Listed companies 1.80 3.72 
Private companies 36.37 23.02 
Individuals 17.93 7.67 
State/local authorities 1.01 1.52 
Market 36.47 51.70 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: S&P Capital IQ 
(*) % on the total market capitalization 
 
As shown in Table 4.5, private companies and individuals are the main 
shareholders of medium-sized listed firms, holding directly respectively 36.37% and 
17.93% of total capitalisation. These two types of the owner are the signs of the 
importance of family ties among medium-sized companies. The majority of the private 
companies are family holding companies with whom major shareholders retain the 
control on the listed companies, while the stakes of individuals belong to family 
members, often linked to the same surname. Private companies may also be seen as a 
mechanism with which families control groups of firms. Many listed companies are, in 
fact, controlled by unlisted companies: this is also the case of big listed groups controlled 
by family dynasties such as Fiat, Benetton, etc. 
The comparison with the ultimate owners of the total Italian listed firms shows 
that such types of owners present an important role also in the larger aggregate, but in 
lower terms. At the end of 2017, private companies resulted to be the major 
shareholders also in the total listed firms, representing slightly more than 23% of the 
market, while individuals had on average only 7.67% of total capitalization. With the 
increase of corporate dimensions, the role of single individuals in the ownership drops, 
and the contestability of control becomes higher, due to the rise of institutional investors 
and dispersed ownership (market). 
As regards institutional investors, in fact, medium-sized firms seem to not be able 
to attract a high interest: the stakes of such investors are only 6.42% of total 
capitalization. Their role is therefore very limited, even though the figures are probably 
underestimated because some of them belong to the market, owing shareholdings 
smaller than 2% of capital. This is probably due to the governance features of such 
companies, and the high ownership concentration in particular, which allow a certain 
degree of expropriation of the minority shareholders rights. 
The situation is slightly better for the entire market (average of total listed firms), 
where the stakes held by institutional investors are 12.37%, nearly twice the medium-
sized aggregate. In this case, the shareholdings belonging to the market are more than 
51%, whereas the market presents an average stake of 36.47% in the case of medium-
sized firms. It is therefore evident that such type of companies holds a closer ownership 
structure which is not very appealing to institutional investors, especially operating at 
an international level. 
Among such type of investors, the role of venture capital and private equity funds 
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is predominant, confirming that most medium-sized listed firms are still in their first 
stages of development. Moreover, following the theoretical framework of the resource-
based view of the firm, the presence of such investors in the board of directors could 
enhance the effectiveness of its monitoring role and the competencies of the board, with 
a positive impact on corporate performance (Rosenstein et al., 1993). 
Financial institutions, such as banks and investment banks, instead, held 
approximately 0.12% of medium-sized firms’ capitalisation. This low average stake is 
probably due to the fact that we decided to not include financial firms in the sample, as 
usually the participation of financial institutions is almost concentrated in other banks 
and insurance companies. 
In Italy, banks are still reluctant to own firm’s shares (and when it happens, it is 
probably related to companies’ financial difficulties) and they are not used to offer 
companies financial support in the market for corporate control. Italian corporate 
governance system is a bank based one, but Italian banks are very different from the 
Hausbank model of the German system: the relationship between banks and firms is 
not as strong and exclusive and they tend to remain out of financial markets. Even 
when banks provide long-term capital to companies, their participation in firms’ 
governance is almost absent. 
Lastly, as regards State ownership, the average stake accounts only for 1.01%: the 
percentage is however mostly related to the presence in some medium-sized companies 
of high stakes of local authorities, such as in Acsm-Agam and Centrale del Latte 
d’Italia. Also in the case of total listed firms, the State seems no longer a relevant 
shareholder: the huge process of privatization has indeed increased the role of other 
shareholders. However, the State or local authorities retain the control of 21 companies, 
mainly active in the service sectors and in companies with a large capitalization 
(Consob, 2017). 
 
4.6.2. Control enhancing mechanisms 
 
Considering the high level of ownership concentration and the presence of firms’ large 
shareholders, the separation between ownership and control in medium-sized listed 
firms is achieved mainly by means of a set of mechanisms created in order to enhance 
control. Firm’s ultimate owners may, in fact, use different instruments for separating 
ownership from control, causing a significant wedge between their voting and cash-flow 
rights, such as pyramiding groups and shareholders’ agreements, usually used by 
families, as well as dual-class shares. 
As already seen, recourse to control enhancing mechanisms, such as pyramids and 
dual-class shares, has kept decreasing over time for the Italian listed companies 
(Consob, 2017), but this decreasing process seems less evident for medium-sized firms. 
The large stake held by private companies (36.37%) may be seen as a sign of the 
importance of groups of firms. Pyramiding groups “enable shareholders to maintain 
control throughout multiple tiers of ownership while sharing the cash flow rights with 
other (minority) shareholders at each intermediate ownership tier” (Goergen, Manjon, & 
Renneboog, 2004), so they are instruments for obtaining control over the greatest 
amount of assets with the smallest capital investment. In this sense, they have been 
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mainly used by the principal actors of Italian “capitalism without capital” (Bianchi et 
al., 2001): families. It is therefore not surprising that in the case of medium-sized firms 
that are largely owned by individuals belonging to a family, such a mechanism is still 
rather diffuse. 
Shareholders' agreements are the other relevant mechanism used by medium-
sized listed companies, as reported in Table 4.6. Such instruments enable shareholders 
to exert a much higher degree of control on a company as a group of shareholders than 
as single individuals, especially when a formal contract among the different 
shareholders exists. 
 
Table 4.6. Control models of Italian medium-sized listed firms – 2017 
 
 Number of firms % (medium-sized firms) % (total Italian listed firms) 
Majority control 31 44.93 27.2 
Weak control 7 10.14 43.6 
Formal coalition control 12 17.39 6.5 
Not evidence of control 19 27.54 22.6* 
Total 69 100.00 100.00 
Source: S&P Capital IQ and Consob (2018) 
(*) In this control model Consob included also cooperative companies 
 
While it is evident an ongoing decline of the formal coalition form of control for the 
total Italian listed firms (only 6.5% of the total listed companies are controlled by a 
formal coalition), in 2017 more than 17% of medium-sized firms presented a formal 
coalition among the main shareholders (12 firms). In most of the cases, the coalitions 
are necessary for obtaining the majority of the stakes, but in few companies, the major 
shareholder presents a shareholding above 50% of total capitalization, being the “pivot” 
member of the coalition. In these cases, the agreement among the parties is not devoted 
to obtaining the majority of the voting rights, but a mass of not hostile minority 
shareholders or the “consensus” of other family members. 
This is confirmed from the analysis of the principal characteristics of the formal 
shareholders’ agreements (Table 4.7): 6 out of 12 coalitions are not voting trusts, but 
agreements that block the sale of shares to hostile or not appreciated investors. The 
average percentage of syndicated shares on total firm’s capitalization is therefore very 
high (63.15%) in these types of agreements, as the main shareholder does not need to 
reach the majority of stakes. Such percentage is even higher in case of global 
agreements which regulate voting rights and shares’ sale (83.57%). The pivotal 
shareholder who owns the main shareholding in the block and global coalitions, on 
average, retains more than 45% of outstanding shares, assuming an influential role in 
the coalition. Such role is minor in voting agreements, where the main shareholding is 
on average 25.42%. 
Informal coalitions among shareholders are, instead, less frequent than in total 
listed firms. The weak control model is present only in 10.14% medium-sized firms, 
against 43.6% of the total aggregate (Table 4.6). This latter presents a trend towards 
“more open” forms of control that is also confirmed by the decreasing role of companies 
controlled with percentages of shares over 50% (majority control), while medium-sized 
firms present in the 44.93% of cases close ownership, with very low levels of 
contestability. 
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Table 4.7. Principal characteristics of shareholders’ agreements of Italian medium-
sized listed firms – 2017 
 
Type of shareholders’ 
agreement 
Number 
No. Shareholders 
(average) 
Syndicated 
shares* 
Main 
shareholding* 
Vote 2 2.50 33.41 25.42 
Block 6 2.67 63.15 45.60 
Global 4 5.50 83.57 46.69 
Total 12 3.58 65.00 42.60 
Source: Consob website 
(*) % on total market capitalization 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
 
The chapter tries to extend current knowledge on the corporate governance features of 
medium-sized listed firms, focusing the attention on the ownership structure and 
composition of a sample of Italian firms, together with the control enhancing 
mechanisms used for separating ownership from control. Such type of companies seems, 
in fact, to have received minor attention, despite the importance acknowledged by 
governments to smaller companies in the development of local economies, especially in 
those countries (for example in the non-Anglo Saxon context, Italy and Spain) 
characterized by widespread entrepreneurship. 
Data from 69 medium-sized listed firms showed, responding to the first research 
question, that ownership is still highly concentrated, even after the listing process. In 
the majority of the companies, an ultimate shareholder who controls on average nearly 
50% of the shareholding is present. Moreover, his position is reinforced by other 
relevant shareholders that often are included in a formal shareholders’ agreement. In 
particular, in 31 cases control rests on a single shareholder, holding more than half of 
the ordinary shares, while in 12 cases a shareholders’ agreement is in force; the 
contestability of control is therefore very limited. 
The ultimate controlling agent keeps being a private company in the majority of 
medium-sized listed firms, which together with “individuals” is the sign of the role of 
families in the ownership structure of such firms. On the contrary, they seem to not be 
able to attract institutional investors that are probably afraid of the emerging of private 
benefits of control, following an agency theory perspective. Among institutional 
investors, a certain role is however performed by venture capitalists and private equity 
funds, which may enhance the effectiveness of the monitoring role and the competencies 
of the board. 
As regards the second research question, it has been evident that the principal 
instruments used for enhancing control are pyramidal groups and shareholders’ 
agreement. Coalitions are sometimes necessary for obtaining the majority of the stakes, 
but in few companies, as the major shareholder already presents a shareholding above 
50% of total capitalization, the agreement among the parties is aimed at building a 
block of not hostile minority shareholders or the “consensus” of other family members. 
The chapter provides insights useful for both scholars and practitioners. 
Concerning academic implications, the chapter develops corporate governance literature 
on smaller firms which is not so widespread among scholars and SMEs literature, 
focusing on a neglected area of research: medium-sized firms. 
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The study has also some implications for governments and local authorities or 
financial market regulators, as it emerges that the listing process of such companies 
does not create more open ownership structures, which are appealing for institutional 
investors. 
Despite these contributions, the chapter still suffers some inherent limitations. In 
particular, the analysis is focused on a single year and on a single country; future 
studies should develop longitudinal analyses and enlarge the sample to companies 
belonging to other countries, in order to build comparative studies. 
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